Since time immemorial, studies on any field relating to cognition, the view of the human mind, is that it is both a storehouse and a processing center of whatever we experience with our senses. Nobody can know what anybody is thinking or what goes on inside somebody’s head, however a person’s thought processes are reflected on their actions. However, “mental abilities” and “mental processes” have always been viewed as “all in the head.” This paradigm of the human mind has persisted even though the metaphor used to describe the human mind has changed throughout the years, from a bucket to contain information, a filing cabinet, and in recent decades a computer. This paradigm is what is known as cognitivism, and it has been the foundational paradigm upon which any studies relating to human cognition stands on.
A recent increasingly influential school of thought is countering this paradigm. According to this view, the mind is embodied, extended, and distributed and that mental processes are not all inside the head. In contrast to Cognitivism which views the material world as mere inputs and outputs of what goes on inside the head, this school of thought advances the theory that the very elements of the outside world form part of the cognitive process.
This paradigm shift opens the floodgates to exploring how the material world around us is not a mere aid to our cognitive processes but that it forms a part of our cognitive processes.
In the book “How Things Shape the Mind,” Lambros Malafouris explains exactly that. Published in 2013, the book thoroughly explains his “Theory of Material Engagement” which advances the view that material things are not merely aids, inputs or outputs of our cognitive processes but part of our cognitive processes.
The theory sounds interesting and intriguing. However, let me play devil’s advocate and make a case for cognitivism. Inasmuch as I respect Malafouris’ work, this is my two cents worth on what’s wrong with the theory of material engagement.
For starters, Malafouris book is titled wrongly. The title is “How Things Shape the Mind.” Isn’t this in itself an admission that things are “inputs” to the mind. His whole argument is that our things is part of the cognitive processes, so his book should be entitled “How Things Form Part of Our Mind.” Or alternatively, “How Things Form Part of Our Cognition.”
Secondly, Malafouris is just arguing in semantics. Cognitivists no doubt admit to the fact of brain plasticity. Things do change the mind. The human brain is unique and complex, and it is still a wonder how neural circuits are rewired in response to whatever input it receives from the outside world. But regardless, mental processes are still mental processes. (That is why it is called mental in the first place.) Anything that is outside of the physical brain is not a mental process. The word cognition itself comes from the Latin verb cognosco which means to conceptualize and to recognize. We conceptualize with our mind. Things or anything outside the brain don’t form part of our cognition, and these are mere input and outputs of our brain.
If the intention of Malafouris is to change the meaning of cognition to include our interaction with things, that’s fine with me, but take note that our “interaction” is still a mental process and still only goes on inside our heads. Whether we like it or not, objects we interact with are mere inputs to this interaction and nothing else. Cognitivism is still here to stay.
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